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vABSTRACT
Threat characterization is a key component in evaluating the threat 
faced by control systems.  Without a thorough understanding of the threat 
faced by critical infrastructure networks, adequate resources cannot be 
allocated or directed effectively to the defense of these systems.  
Traditional methods of threat analysis focus on identifying the capabilities 
and motivations of a specific attacker, assessing the value the adversary 
would place on targeted systems, and deploying defenses according to the 
threat posed by the potential adversary.  Too many effective exploits and 
tools exist and are easily accessible to anyone with access to an Internet 
connection, minimal technical skills, and a significantly reduced 
motivational threshold to be able to narrow the field of potential 
adversaries effectively.
Understanding how hackers evaluate new IT security research and 
incorporate significant new ideas into their own tools provides a means of 
anticipating how IT systems are most likely to be attacked in the future.  
This research, Attack Methodology Analysis (AMA), could supply 
pertinent information on how to detect and stop new types of attacks.
Since the exploit methodologies and attack vectors developed in the 
general Information Technology (IT) arena can be converted for use 
against control system environments, assessing areas in which cutting 
edge exploit development and remediation techniques are occurring can 
provide significance intelligence for control system network exploitation, 
defense, and a means of assessing threat without identifying specific 
capabilities of individual opponents.
Attack Methodology Analysis begins with the study of what exploit 
technology and attack methodologies are being developed in the 
Information Technology (IT) security research arena within the black and 
white hat community.  Once a solid understanding of the cutting edge 
security research is established, emerging trends in attack methodology 
can be identified and the gap between those threats and the defensive 
capabilities of control systems can be analyzed.  The results of the gap 
analysis drive changes in the cyber security of critical infrastructure 
networks to close the gap between current exploits and existing defenses.
The analysis also provides defenders with an idea of how threat 
technology is evolving and how defenses will need to be modified to 
address these emerging trends.  
vi
vii
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................................. v
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................. 1
2. WHY TRENDS IN IT SECURITY RESEARCH ARE IMPORTANT FOR CONTROL SYSTEM 
SECURITY......................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1 0-day Exploits as Threat Vectors .......................................................................................... 3
2.2 Ripple Effect of Data Sharing ............................................................................................... 3
3. SIGNIFICANCE OF OPEN-SOURCE IT SECURITY RESEARCH............................................... 5
3.1 Life Cycle of a 0-day Exploit ................................................................................................ 5
3.2 Value of Open-Source Security Research ............................................................................. 5
3.3 Nature of the Computer Security Research Community ....................................................... 5
3.4 Applicability to the Control System Environment ................................................................ 6
4. ATTACK METHODOLOGY ANALYSIS (AMA) .......................................................................... 7
4.1 AMA as a Threat Analysis Tool............................................................................................ 7
4.2 What is AMA?....................................................................................................................... 7
4.3 Level of Vulnerability ........................................................................................................... 7
4.4 Value of Systems................................................................................................................... 8
4.5 Example of a Threat Assessment Using AMA...................................................................... 9
4.6 Using Gap Analysis to Direct Defenses .............................................................................. 10
5. ANALYZING IT SECURITY RESEARCH FOR THREATS........................................................ 13
5.1 Ascertaining What Information Is Useful ........................................................................... 13
5.2 AMA Tasks ......................................................................................................................... 13
6. SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Appendix A  What Is A Security Researcher?............................................................................................ 15
Appendix B  Preliminary Analysis Information ......................................................................................... 21
Appendix C  Life Cycle of 0-Day Exploits................................................................................................. 25
viii
1Attack Methodology Analysis:   
Improving Control System Security 
through the Evaluation of Current Trends in  
Computer Security Research 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At present, control system security efforts address two predominant issues: a) how to 
secure older, proprietary networks, and b) how to secure new systems, which incorporate 
Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) software and standardized networking protocols, from 
known threats. The focus of this work, however, has been primarily technical and reactive in 
nature, i.e., adding new signatures to the anti-virus libraries to detect new worms released.  What 
has been overlooked up to this point is the need for more proactive efforts, focused on the 
direction from which new threats might emerge.  
Historically, threat analysis relied upon a solid understanding and analysis of four aspects 
of threat: a) who is interested in attacking the U.S., b) how strong their motivation for doing so 
might be, c) where U.S. defenses are weakest, and d) what capabilities known adversaries have 
to exploit those weaknesses.  Conventional threat analysis techniques do not work well, however, 
when trying to characterize computer-based threats.  Established techniques fail when applied to 
cyber threats because it is difficult to obtain necessary information rapidly enough and the 
traditional threat model is not as scaleable or as dynamic as is needed to adequately analyze 
cyber threats.
Too many people have the resources required to carry off a successful cyber attack—an 
Internet connection, an understanding of control system networks, and strong technical skills—to 
identify potential cyber adversaries with any degree of accuracy.  Because of the ready 
availability of the required resources, people who may not have the motivation or assets 
necessary to perform a physical assault can perform computer-based strikes against a target with 
relative ease.     
How, then, can an effective understanding of cyber adversaries be developed?  Because 
exploit methodologies and attack vectors developed in the general Information Technology (IT) 
arena can be converted for use against control system environments, analysts can identify which 
of these ideas are most likely to be used against control systems and what types of defenses will 
be needed to deter the threat.  Understanding how hackers evaluate new IT security research and 
incorporate significant new ideas into their own tools provides a means of anticipating how IT 
systems are most likely to be attacked in the future.   
This analysis technique, Attack Methodology Analysis (AMA), can be used to validate 
exploit technology that can be used against control system environments, identify gaps that exist 
in control system defenses, and associate known mitigation techniques with the defensive gaps.  
This research maps IT-based exploit tools and attack methodologies to specific vendor control 
systems, thereby supplying defenders with pertinent information regarding the detection and 
mitigation of cyber threats to control systems.  By assessing areas in which cutting edge exploit 
2development and remediation techniques are occurring, analysts can develop significant 
intelligence regarding control system network exploitation capabilities, practical defensive 
techniques for new threat vectors, and threat assessments in a dynamic fashion and without 
having to characterize adversarial capacity.  
Attack Methodology Analysis begins with the study of what exploit technology and attack 
methodologies are being developed in the IT security research arena within both black and white 
hat communities.  Once a solid understanding of the cutting edge security research is established, 
emerging trends in attack methodology can be identified and the gap between those threats and 
the defensive capabilities of control systems can be analyzed.  The results of the gap analysis 
drive changes in the cyber security of critical infrastructure networks to close the gap between 
current exploits and existing defenses.  The analysis also provides defenders with an idea of how 
threat technology is evolving and how defenses will need to be modified to address these 
emerging trends.  
By tracking the work currently underway in the IT security research community and how it 
affects control system security, computer-based threats to control system networks can—to some 
extent—be anticipated.  Once these trends have been identified, a gap analysis between cutting 
edge research and current defensive capabilities of control system (CS) networks can be 
performed to pinpoint where the CS networks are most vulnerable.  This approach to threat 
analysis allows defenders to focus their resources on the most vulnerable points of the network in 
a logical manner.  
32. WHY TRENDS IN IT SECURITY RESEARCH ARE 
IMPORTANT FOR CONTROL SYSTEM SECURITY 
2.1 0-day Exploits as Threat Vectors 
Note:  0-day exploits are those exploit tools that utilize vulnerabilities unknown to the 
general IT security community or exploit code for known vulnerabilities that the general security 
community does not have detection mechanisms.  Once 0-day exploits become known to the 
general security community, protective measures are rapidly developed to block, detect, 
mitigate, or fix the problem.
IT security research is always ahead of the defensive curve because defensive actions are, 
by definition, reactionary.  People hoping to secure a computer network, including control 
system environments, can only protect the network against attacks that have already been 
identified by members of the general IT community.  Security professionals, or those IT experts 
who implement computer security technology but do not contribute to security research, are not 
members of a very small, close-knit research group that develop cutting edge attack 
methodologies and techniques, also known as 0-day exploits. 
Rather, they are dependent upon 0-day research becoming well-known, allowing vendors 
and development groups to gather enough information about the exploit technique to fix the 
vulnerability.  In short, only known attack methodologies can be blocked, leaving a gap between 
what is known to the general security community and what true capabilities exist to carry off a 
successful attack against IT—and, potentially, control system—networks. 
By ascertaining which 0-day research could be used effectively against control systems, 
threat vectors on control systems can be identified by defenders before those openings are used 
to mount an attack against the network.  If the holes a hacker would use to get onto the control 
system network can be detected early on, defensive measures can be put in place to eliminate the 
threat vector entirely or block an attacker’s access to that point of entry.   
2.2 Ripple Effect of Data Sharing 
While most people in the general IT security community do not have access to information 
regarding 0-day research, a small cadre of IT security experts who are very well informed about 
the latest trends in attack methodologies and current 0-day exploits does exist.  (See Appendix A 
for more information on IT security researchers and hackers.)  
These are the IT security researchers, who are always communicating with others in their 
field and who are influenced by the work and research being done by their peers. They know 
what cutting edge research is being done; what software can be penetrated via this research; what 
the new attack techniques and methodologies (0-day exploits) are being circulated in the black 
hat community; and how defenders can begin to protect their networks from such attacks. 
Security professionals who are not members of this very small, close-knit research group do not 
have access to such information and are dependent upon the 0-day exploit becoming well-
known, allowing vendors and development groups to gather enough information about the 
exploit technique to fix the vulnerability. 
4Information sharing among the very best hackers and researchers in the IT security field is 
based upon the relationships the people have with each other.  While a hacker may often 
associate with other black hat individuals and groups, he or she is just as likely to associate with 
white hat individuals or groups, too, because of the nature of the community.  This allows 
outsiders to track the flow of information from the inner circle of the elite outward to the general 
IT security community, much like watching the ripples in a pond flow outward from a 
disturbance in the water.
Attack Methodology Analysis takes advantage of the ripple effect of data sharing within 
the elite circles of IT security research to identify emerging threats and how they can be 
mitigated.  This analysis can be used to detect cyber threats to specific software components of a 
control system, ranges of control systems produced by individual vendors, or a particular 
network architecture deployed by a company or organization.    
Note: This type of analysis requires a high level of technical expertise on the part of the 
analyst, and familiarity with the IT security research community.  Moreover, the focus of the 
analysis must concentrate on the research being done—not the researcher himself. 
53. SIGNIFICANCE OF OPEN-SOURCE IT SECURITY RESEARCH 
3.1 Life Cycle of a 0-day Exploit 
0-day exploits come to the attention of the general security populace in one of three ways.  
A researcher or hacker publishes the vulnerability and perhaps proof of concept (POC) exploit 
code for it in order to be recognized for their work.  The tool is discovered and analyzed during a 
forensics investigation of a successful attack in which the exploit was used.  Then, the 
investigators publish their findings to others in the general security world.  Or, the tool becomes 
so widely distributed in the IT security research community that it is eventually leaked to 
members of the general IT security community because it is no longer viable as 0-day code.  
Rather, the security vendors and developers have enough information to detect, mitigate, or stop 
the exploit. 
Once the code becomes public knowledge, vendors and developers can issue patches, 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Anti-Virus (AV) vendors can distribute signature files to 
their users, and perimeter defenses can be hardened.  People defending general IT networks can 
begin responding to the problem, preventing the exploit’s use on a widespread basis.  (See 
Appendix C for more information regarding exploit development.)   
3.2 Value of Open-Source Security Research 
Much of the best work in the IT security research is open-source and can be evaluated or 
used by anyone with an Internet connection and interest in the field.  While much of the newest, 
most innovative work is known only among those in the elite research community, the 
researchers do share some new ideas in open-source channels such as mailing lists, vulnerability 
advisory postings, and security conferences. Other individuals may actually publish working 
exploit code for previously unknown vulnerabilities on hacking websites, covert IRC channels, 
or limited access mailing lists.   
This is significant for two reasons:  a) mature exploitation tools are readily available for 
potential attackers to use, which increases the threat to control system networks, and b) open-
source information regarding potential threats can be gathered without requiring information 
regarding the attack capabilities of specific adversaries.
3.3 Nature of the Computer Security Research Community 
The computer research community, i.e., good security researchers and hackers, as opposed 
to the entire community of computer security professionals and academic experts, is very tightly 
knit, exclusive, and suspicious of newcomers.  To successfully gain entrance into the circle, a 
person must demonstrate a very high level of knowledge about computer security, contribute to 
the atmosphere of constant learning, and be prepared to share ideas and tools in exchange for 
those of others.
Due to the nature of the community, hackers and researchers, regardless of the color of 
their hats, interact frequently to share ideas, research, and tools.  And, because people tend to 
specialize in only one or two areas of expertise, hackers and researchers depend on this swap of 
6information to become better at what they do and to enhance their abilities to assess and secure 
or to assess and attack networks.  This bartering of research allows the researchers to develop the 
weaker areas of their tool kits, as well as providing them with an audience with whom they can 
further develop or create their own ideas.
3.4 Applicability to the Control System Environment 
Many of the general IT vulnerabilities and exploits do not work in control system 
environments.  But, as control system vendors move toward using standardized network 
protocols, application architectures, and operating systems, these problems will begin affecting 
control system networks.  To mitigate the damage these tools could do once they are ported over 
for use in a control system network, control system security personnel can begin evaluating IT 
security research and ascertaining what defensive measures can be taken to prevent their use.   
(See Appendix B, “Preliminary Analysis Information”.) 
74. ATTACK METHODOLOGY ANALYSIS (AMA) 
4.1 AMA as a Threat Analysis Tool 
Attack Methodology Analysis was developed specifically for performing threat 
assessments on computer-based networks.  As such, it is a flexible, dynamic, and scaleable 
model for measuring cyber threats and can be used without having to identify a specific 
adversary or adversarial capability.  AMA uses baseline information about system security and 
publicly available information regarding existing threat technology that could be used by an 
adversary to take advantage of the system’s weakest points.     
Once a network’s vulnerabilities have been base-lined and a value for the system has been 
established, open-source research can provide information regarding what attack methodologies 
and tools are available for a potential adversary to use.  Threat analysis efforts can then be 
focused on the threat posed by exploit technology rather than the threat posed by a specific 
adversary.
4.2 What is AMA? 
AMA is the process of identifying components of control systems, identifying 
vulnerabilities in those components, mapping existing exploits or attack tools to those 
vulnerabilities, and analyzing the gap between current defensive capabilities for those 
vulnerabilities and accessible exploit technology.  The gap between the defensive techniques and 
the offensive resources is the level of vulnerability that exists on the system.  The threat can be 
determined by weighing the level of vulnerability on the system in conjunction with the value the 
system has on the network.   
Threat is measured using the following formula: 
Threat = Level of Vulnerability + Value of System 
4.3 Level of Vulnerability 
The level of vulnerability on a computer host, including those in a control system, is based 
upon the number of security holes open on the host in any given configuration.  Because new 
vulnerabilities are published to security websites or mailing lists daily, the level of vulnerability 
existing on a network changes frequently as well.  Once these weak areas are identified by 
vendors or software development communities, a means of securing the hole can be developed.  
Until the vulnerability is published and a fix is released, however, systems remain vulnerable to 
attack via the hole.   
The significance of a vulnerability is based upon how widespread the flaw is, how much 
access it provides an attacker, and how severe the consequences are once the hole has been 
exploited.  If a problem exists in a piece of software that is widely used, for example a popular 
database, operating system or anti-virus program, it raises the importance of the vulnerability.  If 
the hole grants an attacker a great deal of access to resources on a susceptible computer, i.e., 
automatically running a malicious program on the host, the severity of the vulnerability is 
8increased as does the need to develop and deploy a fix for the problem.  Finally, if the flaw 
results in severe consequences such as permitting the adversary to gain remote control or to 
escalate privileges on the box, the vulnerability becomes even more significant in the eyes of the 
security community.  The more significance or critical the nature of the hole, the more important 
it is to fix the problem as quickly and thoroughly as possible.
The level of vulnerability inherent on a host changes frequently as new software is added, 
applications are upgraded, administrative policies are modified, or additional security is 
implemented.  This dynamic state is one reason it is difficult to apply traditional threat analysis 
to cyber security threat modeling.  The rapidly evolving profile of the target system makes it 
difficult to truly assess threat from a specific adversary.  Threat assessments based on 
identifiable weaknesses of a computer provide a more flexible means of evaluating a control 
system’s true threat profile.   
Establishing a computer’s level of vulnerability can be done by simply tracking open-
source information security research and having a general understanding of a network’s 
architecture.  For example, a highly-esteemed security researcher posted news in November 2004 
that his company’s penetration testing software was leaked.  The researcher excels at memory 
attacks and enjoys world-wide recognition for his skill.  The product was his company’s primary 
commercial offerings and contains easy-to-use, reliable, 0-day exploits to use against a wide 
variety of operating systems and applications.  Of most interest, though, was the inclusion of a 
previously-unknown attack targeting the Microsoft server platform and one of its key networking 
components.  This was a serious problem for Microsoft systems administrators because the 
exploits were unknown in the security community, there were no existing means to detect the 
exploit, and the vendor had not yet released a patch to fix the hole.  Security experts began 
identifying attacks using the exploit within days of the leak once details of the flaw had been 
published by the author.  The code provided black hat attackers with a reliable, easy way of 
taking over any host running Microsoft server with the WINS server service turned on, which it 
is by default in 2 of the 3 most widely deployed versions of the operating system.  Therefore, any 
control system deployed with a Microsoft server running the WINS service could immediately 
be classified as having a high level of vulnerability.
This type of vulnerability assessment, which establishes the level of vulnerability, can be 
done for individual software components of a control system, for specific computers on the 
control system network, or for the control system network as a whole.  This approach takes 
advantage of the accessibility of open-source information regarding software flaws and exploits 
to establish a level of vulnerability based on the software components on a computer or network.  
This eliminates the need to identify a specific adversary or his attack capacity.   
4.4 Value of Systems 
A computerized host, including the computers on a control system network, can have 
different values in an organization.  The computer could be a key component of the control 
system and its failure could destabilize the network should hardware failure occur or any of its 
software fail to operate correctly.  The data on a box might have significant economic or 
functional value to an organization; the loss or corruption of the data would greatly impact 
business or control system operations.  The system may also be of high consequence because it is 
9connected to other high value systems and has been identified by adversaries as an entry point 
for their attacks.  The value of the system as a target for a cyber adversary is what is considered 
in AMA.
In AMA, the value of the host is determined by its worth to a potential attacker and the 
probable consequence of its compromise.  For instance, any trusted host residing on the control 
system network that has permission to connect to the business network would be of high value to 
an adversary because it can legitimately exchange data outside the trusted network and is an 
access point to the control system network.  The system would also be of consequence because it 
resides on the trusted network for a reason and is most likely has permission to connect with 
other high-value targets.
Using the example of the exploit code leaked from the toolkit of a prominent IT security 
researcher above, a basic determination of the value of a system can be performed for any 
control system running Microsoft server.  (A list of vendors and systems with integrated 
Microsoft servers can be gathered from the Internet.)  Any computer running Microsoft server 
operating system and the WINS server service is most likely a key networking component on the 
control system network.  Microsoft operating systems are commonly deployed because they 
centralize network control in one or two key points, generally computers running the server 
software, for ease of administration.  Any Microsoft server with WINS server service enabled 
would probably have greater access and higher level of privilege on any of the other Microsoft 
hosts in the environment.  Given the basic understanding of a Microsoft environment, a control 
system that had integrated Microsoft server software with WINS services is a high value target 
for an attacker.   
Again, AMA can be used to generate the value for systems by analyzing easily accessible 
technical information.  Since most control system vendors post supported software on their 
websites, gathering the basic data needed to evaluate system value is a time-consuming but not 
difficult task.
4.5 Example of a Threat Assessment Using AMA 
The following threat evaluation is an example AMA product assessing the threat faced by 
an operational IT network and by those customers with Microsoft servers integrated in their 
control system networks in December 2004.  The example uses the WINS Server Service 
vulnerability detailed in previous sections.
Several mitigation strategies could be used, but most of them are not practical to use on a 
control system network, are not widely deployed, or would cause too much interference with 
system functionality.  The exploit traffic could be blocked if firewalls or Intrusion Prevention 
Systems (IPS) were in place and correctly configured.  However, many control system networks 
allow dial-up access that often bypasses the IPS and firewalls between the control system and 
corporate networks.  Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) could detect the attack if the IDS 
signatures were up-to-date and the logs were being monitored regularly.  Of the Microsoft server 
platforms, only Windows Server 2003 has a host-based firewall and most control system do not 
incorporate host-based protections such as a firewall.  The WINS service can not be disabled on 
Windows Server NT 4.0 without greatly interfering with the networking functionality; Windows 
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Server 2000 and 2003 generally run the WINS service as well—although the operating systems 
can run using only DNS—in order to provide backward compatibility with NT 4.0 machines or 
because the domain structure is dependent upon WINS.   
The level of vulnerability for a Microsoft server was very high until a patch was released in 
December, leaving systems vulnerable to the exploit for almost three weeks.  The value of a 
system running the software was also high given the nature of basic Microsoft network 
architecture.  The threat level was assessed as high and was verified within days of the release of 
the technical parameters to the general IT security community.  IDS development groups, 
honeynet researchers, and systems administrators all announced malicious activity utilizing the 
exploit tool immediately after the publication of the exploit methodology.  Further investigation 
revealed attacks had been carried out against systems before the general IT security community 
received notification of the problem.  So, in this case, the threat to control systems running 
Microsoft server was very high until the patch was released and verified for use on control 
system networks by individual vendors.     
4.6 Using Gap Analysis to Direct Defenses 
The final step in the AMA process is performing a gap analysis between a network’s 
current defenses and existing exploit technology.  The gap between what the network’s 
protective measures can deter and what can still penetrate the network’s barriers directs how 
defensive resources should be allocated.  The short-term or immediate threats to system security 
are driven by the existing threats and the level of security that can be implemented to prevent 
them.   
Control system networks require more carefully constructed security architecture because 
they lack the resilience and flexibility of general IT networks and there are few customized 
defense mechanisms built into them.   The primary short-term defenses on current control system 
networks should focus heavily on detection and blocking mechanisms while workarounds and 
core problem solutions are tested for use on the most valuable systems.   
Emerging threats on the IT network should also be evaluated for potential use against 
control system environments; and, as these threat vectors make their way into the general IT 
community, members of the control system community should pay close attention to the 
mitigation techniques used.  By studying the lessons learned in the IT community and tracking 
the evolution of the exploit and defensive technology, the control system industry can produce 
solid mitigation procedures that are engineered specifically for control system environments and 
begin to integrate core structural defenses into the control system architecture from the beginning 
of the product’s lifecycle. 
A gap analysis using the WINS Server Service vulnerability and threat assessment from 
preceding sections was performed against an operational IT network and a test control system 
network.  The time lag between the release of the vulnerability’s technical parameters and the 
security fix from Microsoft was especially problematic.  The author of the exploit code is a 
professional security researcher whose firm specializes in providing advanced penetration tools 
to its customers.  The code was reliable and worked against most Windows servers running 
WINS service.   
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The general IT community immediately began to generate detection signatures for the anti-
virus and IDS software.  Incoming traffic characteristic of the attack, UDP calls to port 42, were 
blocked on perimeter routers and at the firewall.  Servers that did not require WINS service were 
configured to run with the service shut down or host-based firewalls were run on the systems.  
Servers that could not shut down the service could be monitored to check for successful 
exploitation using internal IDS systems and the servers’ own event logs.  Once the patch, which 
was developed by Microsoft with the help of the researcher who wrote the exploit code, was 
released, the general IT community deployed the fix across their enterprise networks.
The control system community was not as fortunate because the short-term gap analysis 
showed significant problems with existing defenses and the WINS exploit.  While perimeter 
defenses such as firewalls are often used between the corporate and control system networks, 
simply blocking the exploit traffic is not enough.  An attacker could use another attack vector to 
get on the control system network and still use the WINS attack to take over a key Microsoft 
server.  IDS systems help detect that the attacks are occurring, but they have to be deployed on 
the control system network and its key traffic flow areas to be of use.  Many control system 
environments lack customized IDS systems and the personnel, who must have experience with 
log analysis and the CS network activity baseline, to monitor the logs.   
Turning off the WINS service may have worked on CS servers running newer versions of 
the Microsoft Windows operating system (Windows Server 2000 and Server 2003), but older 
Microsoft operating systems (Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 3.5.1) must have WINS service 
running to function.  Finally, operating system patches must often be tested and approved by the 
vendor before they can be deployed to operational control system environments.  And, once the 
vendor approves of the patch, extensive testing on individual CS back up servers should be 
performed to ensure that the operating systems on customized networks do not interfere with 
functionality.  These issues cause security deployment on control system networks to be a much 
more problematic task than security deployment on general IT networks.   
Long-term gap analysis of the WINS Server Service attack methodology and control 
system defenses showed key areas that should be addressed by the control system vendors.  
Some of these issues include: 
x Relatively inflexible control system applications—CS applications should be designed 
more robustly so they can withstand the occasional vagrancies of patch deployment.  
Flexible software architecture design became more critical in the general IT community as 
security became a higher priority and CS developers can use many of the same techniques 
to improve their products.   
x Lifecycle management of core COTS components—Microsoft designs their operating 
systems to last five years and then security support for those products is slowly 
discontinued; NT 4.0 patches are no longer released unless a customer pays for the service 
specifically, and Windows 2000 Server support is scheduled to end within the next 
18 months.  CS vendors and consumers should begin to plan on how they will manage the 
security risks posed by legacy COTS software and what the software upgrade cycle should 
be for CS applications using COTS products.
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x Lack of patch management and security policy—Standard test procedures for patches and 
software upgrades should be well-documented by vendors and consumers so security fixes 
can be deployed as soon as possible when critical problems arise.  Security policy should 
be designed to facilitate the rapid deployment of layered security tools.   
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5. ANALYZING IT SECURITY RESEARCH FOR THREATS 
5.1 Ascertaining What Information Is Useful 
Not all of the traditional IT attacks will work in a control system environment.  Nor have 
all the attacks that would work on a CS network been ported over for the purpose of disabling 
critical infrastructure.  To identify the security research that must be considered for potential use 
in a computer-based attack against a control system, defenders must perform two tasks.  
First, they must evaluate current research to determine if the techniques or tools could be 
used to successfully attack a control system network.  If the exploit tools could be used to run 
attacks against a CS network immediately, then the defender must evaluate what strategies, tools, 
and policies are available to deflect, mitigate, prevent, or identify the existing exploit tools and 
test them for use on a CS network.  Second, if attack methodology could be used to develop 
customized CS attacks, then significant effort needs to be put into developing the security 
architecture deployed in control system environments to address emerging threats.   
5.2 AMA Tasks 
There are five general tasks that must be performed to perform a cyber threat assessment 
successfully.   
x Baseline the control system network architecture and components.  This can be done for a 
specific network, i.e., an individual utility’s CS network, or for individual components 
integrated into multiple vendor systems, i.e., primary COTS software used to develop web-
based consoles for the application.
x Determine the value of control system components to an attacker and the impact a root 
compromise of the system would have on the control system network.  This helps 
determine where defenses are most critical and prioritizes the security deployment 
timeline. 
x Map known vulnerabilities to the control system components on network communication 
and infrastructure, operating system, and application levels to establish a level of 
vulnerability.  This establishes a level of vulnerability and can also be done for specific 
components or for individual networks.   
x Match existing exploit tools and attack methodologies to the vulnerabilities identified on 
the control system network or its integrated components.  If exploit tools for the 
recognized vulnerabilities are available to the general IT security community, a higher 
level of threat exists on the network and the security deployment timeline should be 
accelerated.  If emerging threats can be identified in the attack methodology trends but no 
known exploits are circulating in the general security community, the evolution of the 
methodology should be tracked as it becomes more widely used on general IT networks.
x Evaluate current defensive strategies and tools deployed on the CS network for the mapped 
vulnerabilities, exploit tools, and attack methodologies.  The gap between the CS network 
defensive capabilities and existing exploit code should drive security measures and 
defensive resource allocation.
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6. SUMMARY 
Attack Methodology Analysis allows the control system community to assess the threat of 
a cyber-based attack more flexibly and dynamically than traditional threat models.  AMA is an 
actor-independent threat assessment technique that allows control system defenders to utilize 
known information regarding system value and level of vulnerability to determine threat level, 
rather than focusing on the attack capabilities of certain adversaries.
By tracking open-source IT security research and mapping emerging trends to control 
system components, the control system community can begin to identify potential attack vectors 
onto the CS networks and the tools most likely to be used to exploit those vulnerabilities.  This 
information would allow the vendors and CS consumers to focus their efforts in a more effective, 
timely fashion.   
The intelligence generated by AMA analysis can be used to improve security in a number 
of ways.  For example, control system operators could be trained to assess their networks with 
AMA or have someone else perform an AMA threat assessment; then, they could make 
immediate changes to security architecture and policy based on the threats specific to their 
network.  AMA analysis tying emerging threat information to particular CS applications could be 
used to help vendors design better control system applications with integrated security 
functionality and guide future security development efforts.  Finally, AMA evaluations could be 
used to identify threat trends in the general IT security community that impact the COTS 
software or CS standards that are integrated into various vendor systems.  If the trends can be 
detected early enough, notifications with technical parameters and recommended mitigation 
techniques could be sent to affected vendors and consumers before widespread attacks occur.   
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Appendix A 
What Is a Security Researcher? 
A security researcher is someone who investigates new problems and vulnerabilities in 
computer security and uses their research to help improve security awareness or defenses as a 
whole.  Very good researchers are curious individuals with an outstanding understanding of 
operating systems, networking and network protocols, and application development. They 
typically specialize in one or two areas of expertise, know how software should work, evaluate 
the specifications of protocols and design specifications from unusual perspectives, are very 
creative, and are excellent problem solvers.  
Note:While each researcher or hacker may demonstrate aptitude in one or two aspects of 
research, i.e., covert channel communication, IDS evasion, etc., an excellent researcher is 
familiar with multiple fields and will use techniques from each to evaluate or attack computers. 
Black Hats vs. White Hats 
The term “black hats” refers to a type of computer security researcher who attacks 
networks and computers using previously unknown vulnerabilities and exploit tools with 
malicious intent.  In order to successfully exploit systems, a black hat needs to find new ways to 
break into computer systems and networks, which entails unearthing new vulnerabilities and 
writing exploit code that makes use of the vulnerabilities.
The term “white hats” refers to a type of computer security researcher who assesses and 
protects systems and networks from attack by using black hat tactics.  White hats also unearth 
new vulnerabilities and write exploit code that makes use of the vulnerabilities.  For example, a 
white hat may perform penetration testing or vulnerability assessments with black hat tools on a 
network to identify previously unknown vulnerabilities and to recommend a method for 
remediation.  Or, the white hat may work for an IT security research firm, evaluating products 
for unknown vulnerabilities, writing proof of concept (POC) code, and working with vendors to 
resolve the issues.  The very best white hats frequently exchange information on new research 
and techniques with black hats, although they do not attack systems with malicious intent.  
Note: In this paper, a black hat will also be referred to as a “hacker.”  Although hackers can be 
either black or white hat, the term “researcher” will be used to identify white hat hackers who 
perform security research without the malicious intent to attack networks in order to avoid the 
negative connotations associated with the term “hacker.” 
What a Hacker or Researcher Is Not 
For the purpose of this project, a good hacker or researcher is NOT any of the following: 
1. System administrators who use but do not develop their own security tools or discover new 
vulnerabilities;
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2. Script kiddies—unskilled attackers who do NOT have the ability to discover new 
vulnerabilities or write exploit code and who are dependent on the research and tools of 
others;
3. Worm and virus writers—attackers who write the propagation code used to spread mobile 
malware such as worms, viruses, and Trojans, but who do not write the exploit code used 
to penetrate the systems infected; and,  
4. Web defacers—attackers, typically script kiddies, who specialize in the defacement of web 
pages.
Types of Hackers and Researchers 
The two primary types of hackers and researchers whose work must be considered when 
determining what IT security research is applicable in a control system environment are bug 
hunters and exploit coders.
Bug hunters actually search through OS, application, network protocol technical 
specifications, etc., for errors or faults in the code which would allow an attacker to escalate 
privileges or gain unauthorized access to system resources.  Once a likely issue has been 
discovered, through techniques such as fuzzing and reverse engineering, the bug hunters develop 
the exploit idea and write rough tools used to demonstrate proof of concept (POC).  POC tools 
are often rough drafts used to develop more sophisticated tools; they often only work on a few 
test hosts and are not ready to be used for mass exploitation.  POC tools are 0-day exploits and 
are often given to exploit coders in return for industrial strength exploit tools. 
Exploit coders find writing industrial strength exploit code more interesting.  They take the 
rough POC tools and refine them so they work on an entire version set of the vulnerable 
software.  For instance, the exploit coder may exchange an exploit for a new POC tool from a 
bug hunter that works on only a few, specifically configured Windows 2000 hosts.  After 
examining the POC code and the OS flaw, the exploit coder refines the code so it works reliably 
on Windows NT 4.0, 2000, XP, and 2003 all of the time.  At this point, the exploit is still 
relatively unknown and can be exchanged by the exploit coder for other POC tools or other 
industrial strength exploits.
What Motivates Hackers and Researchers 
Hackers and researchers are generally driven to research by one of three motivations: 
curiosity, money, or strong personal beliefs.  Some researchers and hackers research computer 
security issues as a hobby.  Their curiosity and “just to see if they can” attitude drives them to 
explore applications, operating systems, and networks in ways not typically considered by 
developers.  In general, the unconventional approach they take to investigating the software 
allows them to identify weak sections in code and ascertain how to exploit those areas in ways 
not imagined by the people writing the software.  Hackers and researchers who perform research 
for curiosity’s sake often publish their tools and findings in restricted circles to share their work 
and gain a reputation for being very good at what they do.
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Other hackers and researchers are paid to perform the research.  Hackers for hire are paid 
to write tools for unknown holes or paid to break into networks.  Hackers for hire do not 
generally publish advisories or tools.  Rather, they accumulate tools and share research with a 
very closely monitored, tight circle of associates who have tools and research to exchange as 
well.  This is how they increase their toolkits, improve their ability to break into varied networks 
and systems for their customers, and diversify their own skill level by remaining abreast of what 
is cutting edge research in the field.  Examples of professional hackers would include state-
funded information warfare or operations teams, as well as groups such as the Source Code Club, 
a group who has purportedly offered portions of the Cisco Internetworking Operating System 
(IOS) and Napster source code for sale via various Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels.
Professional researchers are often paid to do penetration testing or vulnerability 
assessments, as well as to write code specifically designed to detect vulnerabilities not previously 
identified by their customers.  Researchers in the security field MUST produce tools or 
advisories of new vulnerabilities they have discovered in much the same way university 
professors publish research papers.  This is an important aspect of a professional researcher’s 
career, which helps establish his or her credibility and brings in more clients.  Other hackers and 
researchers are more likely to exchange ideas and tools with someone who has demonstrated 
ability to generate new ideas and produce solid code.  Examples of professional researchers 
include Simple Nomad, the former L0pht Heavy Industries, Dave Aitel, and others.
Activism through hacking, or hacktivism, is another driver for hackers.  Generally, 
professional researchers do not indulge in the hacktivism attacks because they have a great deal 
to lose if they are caught running black hat attacks.  But, several very good white hat researchers 
and many other black hats have provided tools and run attacks in the name of patriotism, human 
rights, etc.  As with any other attacker, this type of motivation makes a computer-based attack in 
the name of a cause much more difficult to anticipate and deter.  Examples of an attack 
performed for hacktivist reasons include the Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack on 
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo’s website in 1998 by the Electronic Disturbance Theater, the 
group credited with organizing the DDOS, as a show of solidarity with the Zapatistas.  One of 
the best known hacktivist tools was released by cult of the Dead cows (cDc) and is a web 
browser called Peekabooty, which allows people whose access to the Internet is tightly 
controlled by the government—such as China and Iran—to bypass standard firewalls and 
restrictions.
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Preliminary Analysis Information 
A number of points must be established in order to ensure analysts are working from the 
same frame of analytical reference with regard to this project.  The following is a list of general 
assumptions regarding control system networks and their particular security configurations. 
1. No computer network can be completely secured.  A determined, skilled attacker can find a 
way into a system given enough time.  
2. A control system (CS) environment includes both the control system network and the 
business network.  The control system network is comprised of control system specific 
hardware, software, and network protocols that actually manage the data, measurements, 
and control responses of the equipment.  The business network is the general IT network to 
which the CS network is connected.  The connection provides a way for data from the CS 
network to provide quality assurance, safety information, or other data generated by the CS 
applications and used by the company or organization to manage the business aspects of 
CS production.
3. The CS network is at higher risk for attack because the CS networks are frequently 
connected to the business network for data exchange purposes and indirectly connected to 
the public Internet via the business network.  Previously, network connectivity on control 
systems was limited to hard-wired connections from the control system element to the 
communications device and transmitted over a variety of telecommunications network 
architectures.  Today, the communications are transmitted over a much wider range of 
devices and mediums.  
4. Control system vendors are moving toward more standardized networking protocols like 
TCP/IP and DNP3, as well as standardized operating systems (OS) like Linux and 
Windows.  As with traditional IT networks 20 years ago, the standardization of the OS and 
network communication protocols results in increased efficiency, lower cost of ownership, 
and a greater risk for attack.  Additionally, the types of attacks to which the CS networks 
are vulnerable are standardizing as well.  For example, if a vendor builds his data historian 
application for the Windows 2003 Server platform, the data historian requires the same 
level of patching as do those Microsoft hosts on a traditional IT network because the 
operating system and its vulnerabilities are well-known. 
5. Defenders cannot anticipate who or why people will compromise a network because there 
are simply too many potential suspects and motives for the attack.  Many of the less 
skillful attacks can be deflected through a layered approach to security.  A skilled attacker, 
however, will not be deterred by tight security and is familiar with techniques, tools, and 
attack methodologies to defeat such measures.  
6. Due to the very nature of computer networks and vulnerability research, security efforts 
will always lag behind the development of new attacks.  Computer security is primarily 
reactive, not proactive, meaning there will always be unknown, new attacks that can 
potentially compromise a network, both business and CS, that cannot be detected or 
blocked by defenders. 
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7. In this report, the computer security research community does NOT refer to the whole of 
the IT security community, i.e., IT security vendors, research laboratories, etc.; rather, the 
term applies to those people who are researching new ideas for securing computers through 
the use of black hat security techniques.  Some members of the computer security research 
community may be members of the IT security profession; however, many of them may 
work in other career fields and research computer security as a hobby.  
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Life Cycle of 0-Day Exploits 
Why Understanding Exploit Life Cycle Is Important 
In order to truly understand the significance of new research and tools, an analyst must 
know where the exploit or idea is in its development stage.  The more rapidly vital ideas can be 
identified, the better an analyst can evaluate the research for its implication and applicability 
against control system networks.  
To comprehend how exploits are built, an analyst must know how researchers and hackers 
develop and share new vulnerabilities, POC code, and industrial strength exploits.  This includes 
knowing the key areas of computer security expertise, how vulnerability discovery works, how 
exploits are refined, and how the data is shared among researchers and hackers.
Eleven Areas of Computer Security Research Expertise 
The eleven primary areas of computer security research expertise are listed below.  
Researchers and hackers may be very good at one or even two of the areas.  However, when 
evaluating a network or planning an attack, they often need tools or skills in which they are not 
as strong.  To acquire the information or tools, they share knowledge, tools, and exploits with 
others who are skilled in areas complementary to their own.  
Note:While each researcher or hacker may demonstrate aptitude in one or two aspects of 
research, an excellent researcher is familiar with all eleven fields and will use techniques from 
each to evaluate or attack computers. 
1. Reverse engineering—Software reverse engineering involves reversing a program's 
machine code back into the source code in which it was written, using program language 
statements.  In security research, reverse engineering is performed against applications, 
operating systems, and network protocols.  Typically, the researchers and hackers will 
evaluate error reports from random events or forced error events generated through fuzzing 
techniques to see how the system responds to unusual data requests or packet structures.
Once they have determined how the system responds to a stimulus, they are able to 
ascertain where the software may be vulnerable to attack and why, enabling them to begin 
writing POC code to test the hole.
2. Packet crafting is the manipulation of standard packets or generation of unique packets that 
force a network service device, operating system, or application to respond in a manner 
providing the attacker with root, or complete administrative access to the vulnerable 
computer.  Packet crafting is primarily a network protocol-based attack type and requires a 
deep knowledge of networking architecture, protocols, and network service device 
handling techniques.  One of the more well-known packet crafting exploits is the use of 
fragmented packets to bypass a firewall.  
3. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) evasion research concentrates on bypassing IDS 
software, either host- or network-based.  Attackers must be able to break into a system, run 
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commands and software, and communicate remotely with the compromised system 
without being detected by the defenders.  Methods and techniques of bypassing or hiding 
activity from detection systems are critical when trying to break into a network or system.  
A common technique for bypassing the Snort IDS is fragmenting a packet and inserting a 
reset packet between the fragments.  The IDS cannot match the fragmented packet against 
its signature set and breaks state on the session, allowing the traffic through.  Tools such as 
Whisker, written by Rain Forest Puppy and FragRouter, are commonly used to defeat IDS 
software.
4. Operating system attacks take advantage of vulnerabilities within the operating system 
itself.  Developing new vulnerabilities and exploits for operating systems call for low-level 
expertise in operating system architecture and design, how the OS actually implements the 
design protocols, and what services and configurations typically run on specific operating 
systems.  Examples of OS attacks include script injection, memory error techniques such 
as buffer, stack, and heap overflows, or format string attacks. 
5. Embedded systems experts prefer to focus on routers, printers, network, security 
appliances, or other computer systems that use a stripped down version of an operating 
system or highly compact OS for performing real-time tasks.  Embedded systems usually 
only perform a limited number of computing functions, but need to perform them at a very 
rapid rate.  Printer bounce attacks or Cisco IOS exploits are examples of embedded system 
hacks.
6. Database researchers and hackers specialize in the design and development of database 
vulnerabilities and exploit tools.  Since databases often have full administrative access to 
the operating system, a successful attack against the database frequently results in a root-
level compromise of the computer.  The most predominant form of database exploit 
currently in use is the SQL injection.  
7. Web and application specialists prefer to write tools for use against web servers or other 
key application software such as FTP clients, anti-virus clients, web browsers, or media 
players.  If the application software is widely used, then it provides a large population of 
victims for hackers or another venue of entry onto a network by researchers.  As with 
databases, web and application software often run with full administrative access or can be 
compromised in ways that allow the attacker to easily escalate privileges on the system or 
network.  Common application attacks include cross site scripting or script injection. 
8. Mobile device researchers and hackers focus their work in wireless and handheld device 
exploitation.  PDAs, handhelds, cell phones, and Blackberries are all common targets and 
run customized operating systems with different architecture and functionality than 
standard computers.  With the advent of wireless networks and rising use of wireless 
devices, mobile device hacking is becoming more and more popular.  Those devices that 
offer a more full range of computing capabilities like the Blackberries and iPaqs can be 
used as a point of entry from which to compromise networks.  But POC viruses (Cabir, 
MetalGear) and Trojans (Mosquitos) for cell phones have also been released.
9. Shellcoders generally write two different portions of an exploit.  They develop the 
shellcode wrappers, the delivery portion of the exploit, and the shellcode itself, which is 
the payload of a buffer overflow.  Shellcode wrappers are the delivery mechanism of an 
exploit and manipulate the conditions of a specific vulnerability.  Once the wrappers have 
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successfully negotiated the conditions of the vulnerability, the shellcode can be executed.
The shellcode is the executable code that results in the root compromise of the computer.  
Most shellcode spawns a root shell or command prompt from which various commands 
can be run, allowing the attacker to manipulate the computer and its resources at will.
10. Rootkit writers develop the software that is loaded on the compromised system and used to 
remotely control its resources.  This software also helps clean up log files, prevents 
detection of the system’s compromise by masking illicit activities, provides for remote 
administration of the host by the attacker, etc.  BO2k and t0rn are popular rootkits.
11. Covert channel experts develop the techniques and tools used by researchers and hackers 
to hide the communications between the compromised host and the attacker.  These 
researchers and hackers create communication channels that are hidden or difficult to 
detect, so the system administrator and security personnel do not realize illicit activity is 
happening on the victim network.  
Types of Researchers and Hackers 
The two primary types of researchers and hackers are bug hunters and exploit coders.
Each type of researcher or hacker specializes in one or two of areas of security research, but 
prefers either to find new holes or to write exploit code in that area.  
Note: Even though the researcher or hacker may prefer to do bug hunting or exploit coding, he 
will also demonstrate proficiency at both types of research as the knowledge is essential to 
become an outstanding researcher or attacker. 
Bug hunters: Bug hunters prefer identifying new vulnerabilities in software to writing 
industrial strength exploits.  They do write POC code or workable exploits, but their core 
competence lies in their ability to find new vulnerabilities.  Vulnerabilities discovered by these 
hackers and researchers are known to be reliable, result in root compromise of the victim 
computer, and can be used to develop industrial strength exploits.
The process for finding new bugs or vulnerabilities is outlined below.  Bug hunters: 
1. Find vulnerabilities through reverse engineering or other techniques 
2. Discuss ideas with a close cadre of other researchers 
3. Write initial proof of concept code 
4. The POC code works on a limited number of hosts but not all instances of the vulnerable 
software
5. Exploit is not able to be detected by standard security tools 
6. Pass the POC code on to other researchers in exchange for new ideas or tools. 
At this point, the POC code is still a 0-day exploit and is not easily detected or stopped by 
standard IT security tools.  
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Exploit coders: Exploit coders often fine tune or refine the POC tools given to them by 
others in exchange for industrial strength tools, but they may also write their own tools based on 
vulnerability research they have performed.  Exploits written by these researchers or hackers are 
well-known for their reliability and high quality code, meaning they will work on most versions 
of vulnerable software, regardless of individual configuration, and can be run without interfering 
with or crashing the system.  Such high quality exploits are also known as industrial strength 
tools.
The process for refining or developing exploit code is outlined below.  Exploit coders: 
1. Review initial POC code for ease of implementation, reliability of use, and portability to 
other software or versions of the affected software 
2. Discuss ideas regarding the refinement with a close cadre of other researchers and hackers 
3. Make changes to the POC code or rewrite the exploit altogether so it works reliably every 
time it runs on the largest variety of software possible 
4. Pass the POC code on to other researchers in exchange for new ideas or tools. 
At this point, the industrial strength code is still a 0-day exploit and is not easily detected 
or stopped by standard IT security tools.
Awareness in the General IT Security Arena 
0-day exploits come to the attention of the general security populace in one of three ways.  
A researcher or hacker publishes the vulnerability and perhaps POC exploit code for it in order to 
be recognized for their work.  The tool is discovered and analyzed during a forensics 
investigation of a successful attack in which the exploit was used.  Then, the investigators 
publish their findings to others in the general security world.  Or, the tool becomes so widely 
distributed in the IT security research community that it is eventually leaked to members of the 
general IT security community because it is no longer viable as 0-day code. Rather, the security 
vendors and developers have enough information to detect, mitigate, or stop the exploit. 
Once the code becomes public knowledge, vendors and developers can issue patches, IDS 
and AV vendors can distribute signature files to their users, and perimeter defenses can be 
hardened.  People defending general IT networks can begin responding to the problem, 
preventing the exploit’s use on a widespread basis.
